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ABSTRACT
The standard W3C Geolocation API can significantly faci-
litate geospatial data collection as it provides a simple set of
operations for requesting geolocation services across indoor
and outdoor spaces through the Web. Importantly, this API
is privacy-aware in that it provides a basic privacy mechani-
sm for requesting the user’s consent to location acquisition.
In this paper we address the question on whether this priva-
cy mechanism is sufficient to conduct a project for the collec-
tion of geospatial content, in compliance with privacy laws.
The question is of practical relevance as the use of geoloca-
tion standards in line with privacy regulations would make
the development of volunteered geography projects easier.
In this paper we present an interdisciplinary analysis span-
ning across technology and law, and driven by an applica-
tion case. We show the limitations of this API and discuss
a possible extension in line with privacy norms. Although
we confine ourselves to consider European regulations, we
believe that this study can be of more general concern.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database management]: Database applications—
Spatial databases and GIS ; K.4.1 [Computers and soci-
ety]: Public Policy Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Legal Aspects,Human Factors,Standardization
Keywords
Privacy, location-based services, geolocation standards
1. INTRODUCTION
Volunteered geography (VGI) embraces the wide spec-
trum of applications which aim at collecting geospatial con-
tent through the direct involvement of citizens contributing
to the construction or enrichment of maps or of some oth-
er geography-grounded model [11]. Citizens can participate
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in different ways to geospatial data collection. For exam-
ple, they can provide fine-grained knowledge of the territory
and annotate shared maps, as in wikimapia1. Or can act as
mobile sensors, for example to report the location of illegal
dump sites to some organization which can verify the infor-
mation and report it to the appropriate local authorities.
Also, citizens can collaborate to the sampling of individu-
als’ behavior and to the creation of virtuous cycles through
closed loop solutions. For example, car drivers can choose
to disclose their footprint to enable traffic monitoring in real
time and in this way reduce traffic congestion.
In this paper we are concerned with privacy issues posed
by these scenarios. Privacy, along with trust and credibility,
is widely recognized as one of the key challenges in volun-
teered geography [11, 7]. Privacy is especially relevant when
users leave traces of their movement. While sporadic loca-
tions of a mobile device may not be particularly sensitive,
the historical trail of past locations, i.e. the user’s trajectory,
can reveal much about a user’s behavior.
In most countries, location data cannot be collected with-
out providing users with privacy guarantees in compliance
with law. As an example, consider a participatory project
aiming at studying the social habits in a city, for instance
where citizens spend most of their time, which are the social
services they use and so forth. Volunteers living in the city
could be equipped with a smartphone and provided with a
simple application which periodically transmits their loca-
tion to an application server. Analytical methods can then
be applied on the collected data to discover mobility patterns
as in [17]. Even though this initiative is carried out for le-
gitimate and valued purposes, i.e. improving the quality of
social life, it remains the problem of how to practically deal
with the collection of personal location data in compliance
with data protection law. The problem stems from the fact
that location represents personal data and as such can only
be processed in compliance with data protection legislation
which contains obligations for data controllers (e.g. applica-
tion providers) and rights and guarantees for data subjects
(i.e. users). For example, the processing of location data
under EU law may only be allowed with prior consent of the
data subject. In what follows, we refer to this contractual
view of privacy as notice-and-consent model.
Notice-and-consent privacy model. It is the dominant
privacy model in on-line applications [14]. A way to put
in place such a model in our previous example is by re-
cruiting a limited number of participants in advance and
1http://wikimapia.org
requesting them to formally grant their consent to the collec-
tion and processing of location information, after providing
them with appropriate information. However, ensuring that
consent is actually informed is by far not trivial when the
community is open and individuals can dynamically adhere
to the data collection initiative, typically through the Web.
For example Nissembaum coined the term informed consent
paradox to mean that the more information is provided to
users, the less their understanding [14].
In order to provide stronger protection of personal da-
ta (i.e. not only location), different communities advocate
the need of novel privacy rules and concepts, such as the
concept of personal data store [8], and, in social sciences,
the notion of privacy-in-context [14]. Moreover, computer
scientists have developed a broad set of privacy enhancing
techniques to enable the users of on-line applications to ex-
ercise some form of control on the way the location is col-
lected by third parties as well as to prevent attacks from
untrustworthy parties, such as [13, 5]. Yet, to the best of
our knowledge, none of these techniques are deployed in real
applications.
W3C geolocation API. In this paper, we focus on the pri-
vacy issues posed by a specific class of on-line services which
seem relevant for VGI, namely the geolocation services and
in particular those provided through the W3C geolocation
API. The W3C geolocation API (simply API hereinafter)
is qualified as W3C recommended standard since May 2012
[15]. This API provides the abstract specification of a set
of operations, which embedded in Web pages, enable to es-
timate the location of the website visitors. Notably the spe-
cification is privacy-aware in that it states that users shall
provide their explicit consent to location acquisition, thus
in line with the notice-and-consent model. This API is em-
bedded in HTML5, the platform that is revolutionizing the
way the Web evolves, works and is used [1]. Importantly
this API is supported by all major Web browsers.
Research question and contribution. Our research is
driven by the following question: can we rely on the privacy
mechanisms offered by this API to conduct a participatory
project for the collection of personal location data, in compli-
ance with data protection law? The question has important
practical implications as the use of geolocation standards
compliant with privacy regulations would greatly facilitate
the development of participatory applications.
In this paper, we argue that the privacy offered by the API
is not enough to comply with the European data protection
law. Therefore additional measures need to be undertaken
by the developers and this inevitably impacts on the com-
plexity of the application. This is especially true when the
Web applications are provided by small organizations or a-
mateurs, which, as such, cannot easily count on the support
of a legal staff. To support our argument, in what follows we
present an application in which location data from a com-
munity of students are collected in a participatory way on
Web. Based on this experience, we present an analysis of
some legal aspects and discuss a possible extension of the
API to provide more transparency to users.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents a brief overview of location privacy enhan-
cing techniques in on-line applications. Background know-
ledge on geolocation services and data protection legislation
in Europe is provided in Section 3. Section 4 presents the
application case and the related privacy analysis. Section 5
oulines the proposal of an extended API. Final considera-
tions are reported in Section 6.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section we overview technological approaches to
the protection of location privacy in on-line applications.
Actually, we are not aware of significant location privacy
solutions specifically designed to support participatory data
collection. However, there are techniques developed in other
settings which can be usefully transposed in this domain.
A first stream of work regards anonymous network com-
munication, e.g. onion routing techniques [10]. Using this
technique, the users of our participatory data collection project
can communicate their location without disclosing the true
IP address. Anonymous communication is a viable approach
if users can be deprived of their identity. In reality, in
our scenario, identity may be required to increase the lev-
el of trustworthiness of the collected data. Moreover, even
though users can participate anonymously, it is the case that
users can be re-identified based on their location, such as
home. In such a case, supplementary techniques are need-
ed such as location k-anonymity. e.g. [13] and mix zones,
e.g. [2]. Moreover in certain circumstances, as we will see
later on, certain service providers do not accept anonymous
requests.
Another stream of related work regards the protection of
location information in location-based services (see [12] for
a survey). For example, cloaking is a popular privacy stra-
tegy which consists of degrading the accuracy of the location
information. However, whenever the cloaking method is ap-
plied to every location, the quality of the collected data and
thus the effectiveness of the participatory effort can be easily
compromised. More appropriate for the problem at hand are
the cloaking methods which apply to a subset of locations,
to protect, for example, those locations that are considered
as sensitive. Semantic location cloaking methods [5] address
this requirement without excessively compromising the util-
ity of the collected data.
Policy-based solutions is another important research line.
In this case, machine enforceable authorization rules are
specified to regulate the access to shared location informa-
tion [9]. For example, we can envisage applications in which
the location data is disclosed to different parties, depending
on the situation at hand. The use of privacy policies within
VGI applications is however substantially unexplored. Fi-
nally we mention an important contribution related to the
analysis of the privacy issues in the W3C geolocation API
[6].
3. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
Before presenting the key features of the W3C geolocation
API, we overview geolocation techniques commonly avail-
able on popular devices, e.g. smartphones. Next, we briefly
describe those aspects of the European data protection reg-
ulation that are relevant to understand the limitations of the
API.
3.1 Geolocation techniques and services
3.1.1 Local vs. third party positioning
An important distinction for privacy is between local and
third party positioning services. For example, GPS position-
ing provides the user with strong privacy guarantees because
the location is estimated by the receiver installed on the de-
vice. However, GPS positioning presents heavy limitations.
It is power-consuming, moreover the user must be located
in a convenient location for the location to be estimated, i.e.
outdoor and in light-of-sight with satellites. As people spend
most of their time indoor, the fraction of time in which the
GPS signal can be heard is likely marginal. That motivates
the popularity of positioning services which leverage the te-
lecommunication and public/private Wi-Fi infrastructure to
provide seamlessly geolocation services both indoor and out-
door. These services are provided by third parties, i.e. the
location providers (LP).
Figure 1: LBS Architecture: the client transmits to
the LP contextual information (e.g. set of Wi-Fi
access points, AP1,..APn) to obtain the location
Figure 1 illustrates the typical architecture of a location-
aware application in which the location is computed by a
LP. The client requests the location from the LP and then
forwards such location along with the service request to
the LBS (location-based service) provider. Typically, LPs
compute the location based on the contextual information
sent by the client, e.g. Wi-Fi access points in proximity
(e.g. AP1.APn), by properly matching these patterns a-
gainst a large and proprietary database of geo-referenced
access points and cell towers.
In an urban setting, with high density of Wi-Fi networks,
the location returned by the LP can have an accuracy of
10-20 meters. Note that users can interact with diverse LBS
providers offering different services, therefore LPs are in a
location to compile extensive records of users’ location and
movement. If LPs are untrustworthy, privacy is at stake.
We will come back to this point later on.
3.1.2 Requesting geolocation services
Geolocation requests are encoded using machine readable
operations. Operations can be defined at different levels of
abstraction. For example, at operating system level, the An-
droid system provides three classes of operations, for using
GPS-based positioning, for requesting geolocation services
from the LP and for handling passive positioning, respec-
tively2. As the location can be determined using differ-
ent techniques, it is up to the LBS provider, in charge of
the application development, to choose the most appropri-
ate method, based on the application requirements and the
user’s context. This requires a certain programming skill.
2http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/location/strategies.html
The W3C geolocation API provides a much simpler way
to request the geolocation services. First, the API is agnos-
tic of the positioning technology, therefore the geolocation
service can be requested without specifying how the location
is to be estimated. Secondly, operations can be embedded
in Web pages, using a simple scripting language like Java
Script. Therefore, as the API is endorsed by all major Web
browsers, visitors can be localized across different operating
systems. Note however that this simplicity of use is paid
in term of flexibility, in that the LBS provider is not in the
position of exercising any control on the way the location is
computed, in particular on whether the location is computed
locally or through a LP while this is important for privacy.
Indeed, what happens in practice is that the Web browser
translates such operation into a geolocation service request
for the LP3. Accordingly, any time the user is geolocated the
location is communicated to the LP.
3.1.3 Technical features of the API
For the sake of completeness, we briefly overview the key
aspects of this API related to the geolocation functionali-
ties, in particular the information provided by the LP and
the operations for handling the geolocation request. The
privacy-related aspects will be presented later on in the pa-
per.
• Position information returned upon the request
of geolocation service. Some of these data are pro-
vided on developer’s discretion (i.e. are optional):
- Timestamp of the location
- Position as latitude and longitude
- Altitude (optional)
- Accuracy of the location (Long, Lat) in meters
- Accuracy of the altitude (optional)
- Heading (the direction is expressed as angle with re-
spect to North ) (optional)
- Speed in meters per second (optional)
• Geolocation operations. The interface provides
two main operations, to get the single location and to
continuously update the location, respectively. Note
that the latter operation allows users’ tracking. The
abstract specification of these operations is reported in
Figure 2, while a succint description is provided here
below:
-getCurrentPosition(): this operation returns the loca-
tion of the client at the time in which it is requested
-watchPosition(): this operation is to request the re-
peated updating of the location until the operation is
explicitly stopped (i.e. using the clearWatch opera-
tion).
3.2 Location data protection in Europe
In view of the privacy issues raised in this paper, it is
important to have some basic understanding of the general
Data Protection Directive and the so-called ePrivacy Direc-
tive, the main pillars of the EU legal framework regarding
processing of personal and location data.
3.2.1 Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC)
The general Data Protection Directive (hereafter: DPD)
consists of a layered system of three levels. The first level
3http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/geolocation/
Figure 2: Abstract specification of the geolocation
operations
is the general level that applies to all processing of person-
al data. The second level is applicable when sensitive data
are being processed. The third level is applicable when per-
sonal data are being transferred to third countries. The
layered system is cumulative, meaning that if sensitive da-
ta are being transferred to third countries, all three levels
apply. The issues we address in this paper mainly concern
the first level, therefore the second and third level will not
be discussed. Besides the three levels within the DPD, the
EU legal framework on data protection consists of two more
levels of protection, including Directive 2002/58/EC (ePri-
vacy Directive).
The DPD applies to the processing of personal data which
is defined as “any information relating to an identified or i-
dentifiable natural person (data subject)”, while processing
covers“any operation or set of operations which is performed
upon personal data”. Both concepts are interpreted in a
very broad manner. As a main rule, the DPD stipulates
that personal data “may only be processed fair and lawful”.
What fair and lawful entails, can be derived from the oth-
er provisions in the Directive. Main requirements: having
a specific purpose and legitimate basis for the processing of
personal data. Processing is only allowed in accordance with
the specified purpose and may not go beyond this purpose.
Regarding the quality of the data it is determined that data
must be relevant, accurate, not excessive and up to date.
Sound security measures also need to be taken in order to
protect data from being corrupted or destroyed. Further-
more, the data controller has the obligation to inform data
subjects (and in some cases the Data Protection Authori-
ty) regarding data processing. Data subjects have the right
to access, rectification, erasure, blocking and the right to
object. To ensure enforcement, Member States are obliged
to put in place effective sanctioning mechanisms in case of
infringement of the data protection rules.
The obligations in the DPD are addressed to the data con-
troller, defined as the entity that “determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data”. In view of
the actual processing, a controller can engage a processor, an
entity “which processes personal data on behalf of the con-
troller”. However, the controller is responsible for and must
put in place processing contracts with their data processors.
As we will see in the legal considerations in Section 4.2.1, it
can be rather difficult to identify the controller and proces-
sor(s) when the W3C geolocation API is used to provide a
LBS. This is however very important, as it is the controller
who must comply with all rights and obligations laid down
in the legal framework.
3.2.2 The ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC)
The provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC (as amended by
2009/136/EC) particularize and complement the DPD in
the field of electronic communications services. Importantly
this Directive lays down rules regarding the processing of
location data, in particular it states that: “location data
may only be processed when made anonymous or with prior
consent and only for the duration necessary for the provision
of a value added service”, being: “any service which requires
the processing of traffic data or location data other than
traffic data beyond what is necessary for the transmission of
a communication or the billing thereof”. The main difference
between the two Directives concerns the fact that the regime
to process location data in providing value added services is
stricter than the general regime regarding the processing
of personal data. Prior consent and anonymisation are the
only valid grounds for processing location data. In practice,
the only valid ground in most cases will be prior consent as
the Art. 29 WP has stipulated that “true anonymisation is
increasingly hard to realise and (. . . ) the combined location
data might still lead to identification” [16]. Therefore, the
core legal consideration addressed in Section 4.2.1 concerns
the difficulties of the requirement that location data may
only be processed with the prior consent of the data subject,
i.e. user.
4. APPLICATION CASE
The application case consists of a Web application invol-
ving the participants of a recent seminar on location privacy4
in an experiment of location data collection. The purpose of
this project is manifold: i) to experience an active learning
approach to location privacy based on user’s participation;
ii) to highlight location privacy issues related to the use of
W3C geolocation API; iii) to collect data on the accuracy of
the geolocation service offered by popular LPs throughout
Europe. This application has been developed in the frame-
work of the EU project Modap (www.modap.org).
4.1 Location data collection through the Web
The Web application is conceptually simple: it estimates
the location of each user visiting the Web site from any de-
vice, mobile or not, and stores this information together with
the user’s IP and few additional information in a reposito-
ry on the server. Users can then inspect the content of the
repository.
The location is estimated as follows: first the application
invokes the geolocation operation provided by the API (i.e.
the getCurrentPosition operation). If the location is cor-
rectly returned, it is recorded in the repository along with
additional information. Conversely, if the location is not
available, because for example the user denies his/her con-
sent to location collection, then the application computes
a coarse location based on the IP address and using com-
mercial datasets reporting the association between IPs and
geographical locations. In this case, the location is deter-
mined locally. Note that the application does not include
extra code for privacy support beyond what is provided by
the API. The application, called WhereAreYouNow (Wayn)
is available on http://wayn.modap.org. The participants of
the seminar - more than 50 students (PhD and M.Sc stu-
4Summer School on Privacy-aware Social Mining,
mss2012.modap.org
Figure 3: As the Web page is accessed the user is
prompted with the request of consent (in red)
dents) from 13 countries mainly in Europe - were invited to
visit the Web site in advance and leave their footprints.
4.1.1 Accessing the Web site
The interaction with the Web site is as follows: the visi-
tor of the Web site, using for example Google Chrome, is
presented with the page in Figure 3. The text explains the
purpose of the data collection project and asks visitors to
contribute to it. The first time the user visits the Web site,
the Web browser asks the user to grant or deny his/her con-
sent to the disclosure of location. Note that the interac-
tion is completely transparent to the application (i.e. LBS)
provider. The user can then reply yes or no or even not reply.
If the user replies yes then the Web browser records the pre-
ference, i.e. consent will not be requested again, unless the
user deletes this preference, then forwards the geolocation
request to the LP. Conversely, if the user denies consent or
does not reply in a given amount of time (e.g. 10 seconds),
our application records the IP and further information, e.g.
time.
In addition, users are provided with a feedback on their
location. Feedback is important to increase user’s aware-
ness and enhance user’s experience. Feedback is provided
by displaying on a map the logged locations along with the
additional data stored in the repository. The map in Figure
4 shows what the users can see, i.e. the content of the repo-
sitory. This map can be accessed through the home page of
the Web site. The map reports a pin for each record, i.e.
visit. Pins are displayed in different colors based on the ac-
curacy of the corresponding location. The most accurate are
the locations identified by blue pins. Generally these loca-
tions are estimated based on either GPS or through Wi-Fi-
based positioning. The sky colored pins are those typically
detected by the LP based on the IP address. This happens
for example when the user connects to the Web site using
a cabled connection and no other geo-enabling device is on
Figure 4: The map displays the content of the repos-
itory
(Wi-Fi or GPS). Conversely, if the user has denied consent
or has not replied in the given amount of time the appli-
cation displays the coarse location estimated based on the
IP address and the pin is orange. Finally, gray pins are
used in those situations in which the LP cannot compute
the location, for example because of an error, or because
the geolocation request is not accepted.
Each pin is shown along with the information recorded
in the database, including IP address, time, coordinates,
location accuracy and the Web browser footprint (i.e., Web
browser configuration). One additional information that is
currently not displayed to users, is the unique code, acting
as pseudonym, stored as cookie on the mobile device. The
pseudonym is used to correlate locations from the same user
i.e. build the user’s trace. If the user removes the cookie, a
new pseudonym is created and thus also a new corresponding
cookie. Note that this practice is left outside the legal ana-
lysis in this paper as currently a lot of debate exists within
the EU regarding how to practically deal with the revised
legal regime on cookies. However, the legality of this practice
constitutes an interesting question.
4.1.2 Lessons learned
Before discussing the specific privacy issues which emerge
from this experiment, it is worth mentioning interesting out-
comes, of more general interest, of this application:
• Creating privacy awareness in education. This experi-
ment allowed us to illustrate how location can be used
to break the apparent anonymity of users and reveal
personal details. For example, it may be relatively easy
to discover where a person lives based on his/her trace
and temporal information. For example, if an individ-
ual has accessed the Web site early in the morning from
a residential area (the typology of area can be identi-
fied for example through StreetView), it is likely that
the location is in proximity of user’s home. Moreover,
if the same person has left a footprint at the seminar
location (we remind that locations of the same users
can be correlated), the identification is fairly straight-
forward.
• Access constraints to geolocation services. A few par-
ticipants tried to visit the Web site anonymously us-
ing the Tor onion routing system5. In that case, the
geolocation request does not return a location, but an
error. The gray pins displayed on the map in Figure
4 report points which are completely meaningless as
the location is computed based on the IP of one of the
nodes of the onion routing infrastructure. In essence
the LPs are generally aware of the user’s IP address.
• Insights into the accuracy of geolocation services. From
this experiment, it turns out that the accuracy achiev-
able from a LP is a few tens of meters uniformly across
the different countries, such as Estonia, Turkey and
Switzerland. Note however that official statistics from
LPs are not available. Ideally, by promoting a larger
scale participatory project, it would be possible to gain
deeper understanding on the capabilities of third party
geolocation services and come up with useful statistics.
We leave this point for future work.
4.2 Privacy issues
We turn to consider the privacy issues which emerge from
this experiment. We recall that no additional support for
privacy is provided beyond the basic mechanism offered by
the API. Therefore users have only limited control over the
disclosure of their location, as they can only accept or deny
consent. Moreover, the experiment makes clear that users
have insufficient information to express informed consent.
We report some informal considerations here below. Then
we analyze the question from a legal point of view.
• Users are typically not aware of the third party that
behind the scenes computes the location, i.e. the LP.
Even though certain Web browsers somehow provide
this information, the actual implications are not clear
to most of the users.
• As a consequence, the denial of consent is not correctly
understood. Actually denying consent means that the
location is not computed by the LP. This, however,
does not prevent the application from computing the
location in some other way, for example based on IP.
• Users are not aware of the purpose of the Web applica-
tion, unless it is explicitly provided by the application
itself. This simply follows the fact that the API oper-
ations only display the domain name of the Web ap-
plication requesting the location, while there is no way
to add additional information on the privacy policy.
• Users are not aware of the location actually trans-
mitted, unless using application-dependent function-
alities, as we have seen before. Users are surprised of
the high accuracy that can be achieved, whenever GPS
is not used.
• Users are not aware on whether the location is just
computed once or repeatedly, i.e. users are tracked.
This because the current implementation of the stan-
dard does not make clear which geolocation operation
is precisely used (i.e. getCurrentPosition or watchPosi-
tion, see Section 3.1.3). Therefore it may happen that
5https://www.torproject.org/)
the user believes to give his/her consent to the disclo-
sure of the single location while in reality the user is
tracked for the time the Web page is accessed.
• Users are not aware of the fact that by law they could
request the removal of information recorded in the
repository.
4.2.1 Legal considerations
In the introduction the question is raised whether we can
rely on the privacy mechanisms offered by the W3C geoloca-
tion API to conduct a participatory project for the collection
of personal location data, in compliance with data protection
law. In this section we assume the applicability of the ePri-
vacy Directive without entering into the discussion whether
or not the ePrivacy Directive is applicable. For a deeper
understanding of this very complex discussion we refer to
[3]. Moreover, we discuss some of the legal considerations
that are directly relevant in view of amending the API, while
acknowledging a much wider array of legal implications in
need of more in depth research.
We focus in particular on the difficulties regarding the le-
gal requirement of prior consent when use is being made of
the standard W3C geolocation API. Prior consent, as a legal
ground for processing location data, is only valid when con-
sent is specific, freely given and based on information which
is clear, comprehensive, understandable for a broad, non-
technical audience and permanently and easily accessible.
In relation to geolocation services on smart mobile devices
the Art. 29 WP has clarified the concept of consent: it
cannot be obtained freely through mandatory acceptance of
general terms and conditions, nor through opt-out possibil-
ities; the default should be that location services are ’OFF’;
when switched on with consent, the user must continuously
be warned that geolocation is switched on; data subject-
s need to renew their consent after changes have occurred
in the service and even without changes reaffirm their con-
sent at least once a year; besides the possibility to withdraw
consent at any time, there must be a simple means, free of
charge, to temporarily refuse the processing of location [16].
In view of the information to be provided in order to ob-
tain valid prior consent the ePrivacy Directive requires in-
formation regarding the type of location data, the purposes
and duration of the processing and whether the data will
be transmitted to a third party for the purpose of provid-
ing the value added service. From the ePrivacy Directive it
also follows that the processing must be restricted to per-
sons acting under the authority of the provider of the public
communications network or publicly available communica-
tions service or of the third party providing the value added
service. Furthermore, processing must be restricted to what
is necessary for the purposes of providing the value added
service. From the foregoing three main legal considerations
emerge regarding: valid consent; restriction to persons act-
ing under authority; and, restriction to what is necessary for
the purpose.
Valid consent. When use is being made of the W3C geo-
location API Figure 3 shows that the user is informed that
wayn.modap.org wants to track the physical location of the
user. The user has the option to click the yes button, the
no button, to click learn more or not to click anything at
all. A user might expect that the learn more button will
lead to information provided for by Wayn, but it leads to
the privacy policy of the Web browser. Even though here
some information can be found on things like withdrawal,
the validity of the consent can still be questioned. For ex-
ample is providing a learn more button that refers to a Web
page of the Web browser “prior information provided for by
the provider of the value added service”? And what about
other characteristics such as the fact that consent is only re-
quested once, and other legal requirements such as the need
to make ongoing tracking visible for the user at all times.
As the standard W3C geolocation API does not leave any
room for Wayn to customize the location request, the only
option for Wayn in order to comply with data processing
legislation is to provide all information necessary in order to
obtain valid prior consent on the Web site that appears with
the location request. As the request appears in a separate
dialogue box on top of the page, it is questionable if the
user is completely aware of the relation between the Web
content and the request (aggravated by the fact that the
learn button leads to the Web browser). From the perspec-
tive of Wayn it might not be preferred to provide long lists
of information on its Web page, or worse, Wayn might not
have this information available as will become clear below.
Moreover, the information will probably be rather confusing
(remember the information paradox) as Wayn will need to
explain how other parties, such as the Web browser and the
Location Provider are involved in the processing of personal
and location data, while in fact Wayn has no control over
this process whatsoever. This leads to the second legal con-
sideration.
Restriction to persons acting under authority of.
Even though we consider Wayn to be the controller as it is
Wayn wanting to learn its users positions, from a legal per-
spective this qualification is questionable. It is not Wayn
who determines the means of processing, but the Web brows-
er/Location Provider. Wayn has no control over the type
of technologies and data that are being used to pinpoint
the users’ location. Also, not Wayn but the user deter-
mines the Web browser. So, as Wayn cannot specify the
type of positioning technology to use, including the speci-
fication whether the position should be determined locally
or by a third party, it might not even be possible for Wayn
to provide users with all the information necessary to obtain
valid consent. This means we encounter two legal problems.
First, there is no possibility for Wayn to exercise any control
over the way in which the user’s consent is obtained. And
second, Wayn might not even be capable to provide proper
information regarding the data processing process, which is
required in view of valid prior consent. So Wayn must re-
ly on this information to be properly provided by the Web
browser, which party is chosen by the user.
This leads to a whole array of interesting legal questions
regarding the processing of personal and location data by the
third parties involved within the process of providing LBS
and the lack of clarity for the average user regarding the
involvement of these parties. A user of a Web site expects
to be dealing with the owner of the Web site when he is
asked if his location can be pinpointed, while in fact it is his
Web browser that acquires the location information and then
passes this onto the Location Provider, a party probably not
even known to the user. The LP then redirects the service
request of the user, along with his location information, back
to the Web site Wayn. So the Web browser as well as the LP
are aware of IP address and (coarse, depending on whether
or not consent has been given) location of the user.
If we look at the Firefox browser we can see that it presents
a seemingly clear privacy policy (http://www.mozilla.org/en-
US/legal/privacy/firefox.html): the Web browser collects
the Wi-Fi info and forwards the request to the LP. So the
Web browser is the intermediary between the user and Wayn,
but involves the LP in this process. Moreover, as such the
Web browser and the LP are aware of the information and
thus in a position to process the personal and location da-
ta as well, even beyond the purpose of the provider of the
LBS for whom the request is being “translated”. Whether
or not and how this is being done is unclear to us, but al-
so to the user whose privacy is at stake. But even when
these parties only process the data as far as is necessary in
view of the location request of Wayn, legal problems remain.
The qualification of the Web browser and the LP under the
DPD and the ePrivacy Directive is problematic as they do
not fall under the strict authority of Wayn. Moreover, no
formal contracts exist establishing a legal controller - pro-
cessor relationship between Wayn and the Web browser on
the one hand and Wayn and the Location Provider on the
other hand. What the implications are of this rather com-
plex situation is in need of more in depth research, from a
computer science as well as from a legal perspective.
Restriction to what is necessary for the purpose. In
relation to the requirement that processing is allowed only
if necessary for the purpose, a comment can be made re-
lating to the characteristic of Wayn that it calculates and
stores a coarse location position on the basis of an IP ad-
dress even when consent is denied. This does not comply
with data protection legislation. IP addresses are personal
data and thus the processing of this data in combination
with (coarse) location data is only allowed on the basis of
a legal ground. Without consent the location may not be
calculated.
5. EXTENDING THE API
In the light of this analysis, we propose a possible exten-
sion of the API in the direction of transparency. For the sake
of clarity, we illustrate these additional features through the
screenshots of a prototype. In what follows, we refer to this
set of functionalities as extended API. It is worth mention-
ing that the prototype has been built by simply re-defining
the API operations and encapsulating the native operations
in a JavaScript object. This means that the Web browser
has not been extended with additional functionalities (i.e.
plug-in) while the graphical interface handling the interac-
tion with the user is not fully integrated. These limitations
are not really relevant for the purpose of demonstrating the
functionalities of the system. The extended API provides
the following features:
• The geolocation operations are extended with one ad-
ditional parameter, the url of the privacy policy of the
application. Even though the idea is simple, we believe
that this is a substantial improvement in the direction
of aligning data collection to data protection norms.
The privacy policy is an XML document which reports
key information, one of the obligations deriving from
data protection regulation.
• Users are made aware of the fact that their location
is either acquired once or conversely users are tracked.
In the latter case the user can explicitly stop location
tracking. As an additional functionality, users can get
a feedback on the quality of the location information
being acquired.
Figure 5: Extended API: displaying the notice
The prototype has been developed for the geo-enabled
Web site of one of the authors of this paper, as the Web
site can be quickly modified. Figure 5 shows the revisit-
ed interface which is presented to the user when the Web
browser, in this case Firefox, requests the user’s consent.
Besides prompting the request of consent (in Italian), the
geolocation operation displays two additional information
items: (a) A brief notice informing the user of the general
purpose of data collection. In this case, the notice specifies
that location information is only collected for research pur-
poses. This form contains a link to a more detailed notice.
(b) The information that the location would be repeatedly
collected (button Stop Recording geolocation). Depending
of which geolocation operation is requested the user can be
presented with different messages. Figure 6 reports the in-
formation which is shown to the user in response to his/her
consent. This information includes accuracy, the address
and the location on a map.
Figure 6: Extended API: feedback on the location
6. CONCLUSION
This API has the potential to support the development
of large scale geospatial data collection projects through the
Web. In this paper, we have chosen to adopt an interdis-
ciplinary approach because the deployment of the API re-
quires not only a technological background but also some
basic understanding of the data protection regulations. Yet,
a number of issues at different levels are still open and will
be addressed in future work, including: extending the legal
analysis beyond the European law; defining law-compliant
privacy-aware data collection interfaces; and devising privacy-
enhancing technologies to ensure stronger protection from
untrustworthy LP, e.g. [4].
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